Emerging Biosecurity Threats in Our Interconnected World
Imagine a battlefield where the weapons are invisible, the soldiers are scientists, and the front lines extend from sophisticated laboratories to agricultural fields and hospital wards. This isn't science fiction—it's the reality of modern biosecurity, a field that has catapulted from specialized concern to central global priority in the wake of COVID-19.
Recent research indicates that biosecurity threats—from engineered pathogens to agricultural bio-incursions—are evolving at an unprecedented pace, demanding equally sophisticated responses 2 .
As emerging technologies democratize powerful biological capabilities, we face a paradoxical situation: the same tools that could cure diseases and end food shortages might also be harnessed as weapons or accidentally unleash catastrophic outbreaks.
The convergence of artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, and global interconnectedness has created what experts now call "the age of dangerous biology" 3 . This article explores the cutting edge of biosecurity science—from the threats lurking on the horizon to the innovative tools and strategies being developed to keep us safe in this new biological era.
Biosecurity encompasses all activities aimed at preventing the introduction, spread, and impact of harmful biological agents. The US Department of Agriculture defines it as methods and procedures intended to "prevent the introduction, delivery, and spread of disease pathogens that can harm or adversely affect livestock, crops, environments and people" 2 . However, this definition has expanded dramatically beyond its agricultural origins.
Biological threats aren't new, but their nature is transforming fundamentally. Historically, biosecurity focused primarily on protecting agricultural monocultures vulnerable to disease due to their lack of genetic diversity 2 .
Advancements in genetics and DNA research expanded biosecurity concerns to include human pathogens.
Marked a turning point, dramatically reducing DNA sequencing costs and catalyzing a biotechnology boom.
| Threat Category | Examples | Key Characteristics |
|---|---|---|
| Natural outbreaks | COVID-19, H5N1 avian influenza | Zoonotic origin, unpredictable emergence |
| Accidental releases | 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak, lab escapes | Human error, inadequate safety protocols |
| Deliberate weapons | Historical biological weapons programs | Engineered for virulence, stability, dispersal |
| Dual-use research | Gain-of-function studies, AI-designed pathogens | Legitimate research with potential misuse |
| Ecological disruptions | Invasive pests, crop diseases, marine biofoulers | Economic damage, ecosystem alteration |
One of the most challenging aspects of modern biosecurity is the dual-use dilemma—research conducted for legitimate purposes that could potentially be misused.
Gain-of-function studies that enhance pathogen virulence or transmissibility exemplify this dilemma. While such research can provide valuable insights for pandemic preparedness, it also carries the risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens 7 .
Artificial intelligence is accelerating biological research at an unprecedented pace—for both defensive and potentially harmful applications.
AI tools like DeepMind's AlphaFold have dramatically accelerated protein structure prediction, enabling faster threat assessment and drug design 7 . However, these capabilities also lower barriers to designing novel pathogens.
Climate change, agricultural intensification, and urbanization are creating new pathways for biological invasions that affect human, animal, plant, and ecosystem health simultaneously.
The One Biosecurity approach has emerged to address these interconnected threats through an interdisciplinary framework that builds on interconnections between all health sectors 5 .
To understand how experts are responding to these emerging threats, let's examine a crucial research effort in detail: a comprehensive systematic review of published and gray literature on biosecurity threats and responses published in 2024 2 .
| Threat Category | Prevalence | Representative Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Dual-use research of concern | Gain-of-function studies, AI-designed pathogens | |
| Biological weapons | Engineered pathogens, synthetic bioweapons | |
| Ecological impacts of biotechnology | Gene drive organisms, invasive genetically modified species | |
| Accidental releases | Laboratory escapes, transportation incidents | |
| Agricultural bio-threats | Designed crop diseases, livestock pathogens | |
| Cyber-biosecurity breaches | Hacking of biological databases, manipulation of DNA synthesis |
An important finding was the significant disparity in biosecurity research between developed and developing nations. The analysis revealed that North-Transatlantic countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, dominate biosecurity research 9 .
Meanwhile, the Global South shows limited biosecurity research and collaboration despite facing potentially greater vulnerabilities due to less robust healthcare infrastructure and monitoring systems.
Cutting-edge research in biosecurity relies on a sophisticated array of reagents and tools.
| Research Reagent | Function | Application in Biosecurity |
|---|---|---|
| CRISPR-Cas systems | Gene editing using guide RNA sequences | Pathogen detection, gene drive development, therapeutic development |
| Reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) | Amplification and detection of RNA sequences | Diagnosis of viral threats, surveillance of known pathogens |
| Cell-free systems | Protein synthesis without living cells | Portable diagnostics, field-deployable threat detection |
| Lipid nanoparticles | Delivery vehicle for nucleic acids | Vaccine development (e.g., mRNA vaccines), therapeutic delivery |
| Pseudouridine-modified mRNA | Enhanced stability and reduced immunogenicity | Vaccine platforms, therapeutic protein production |
| Radio frequency identification (RFID) | Tracking and identification using electromagnetic fields | Monitoring movement of biological materials, supply chain security |
| Electronic noses (e-noses) | Detection of volatile organic compounds | Non-invasive detection of infected plants/animals, early outbreak warning |
| Autonomous sensors | Continuous monitoring without human intervention | Environmental surveillance, early detection of biological incidents |
In response to these emerging threats, researchers and policymakers are developing innovative governance approaches. The international Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—signed by 183 countries—remains a cornerstone of biosecurity policy 2 .
Recently, there has been growing emphasis on biosecurity education for life scientists. As one report notes, "Educating life scientists on biosecurity and dual-use issues has been recognized as one of several approaches that can, in combination with other measures, enhance biorisk governance and biosecurity" 8 .
An emerging recognition in biosecurity is the need for more inclusive knowledge practices that engage diverse stakeholders, including local communities and Indigenous knowledge holders 1 .
This approach has led to the development of reflective toolkits designed to support practitioners and policymakers with diverse cultural, disciplinary, and professional backgrounds to work together more effectively.
As we stand at the convergence of multiple technological revolutions—in AI, biotechnology, and computing—our relationship with the biological world is transforming fundamentally. The emerging biosecurity landscape presents both unprecedented risks and extraordinary opportunities for protection and prevention.
"What makes biosecurity unique among security domains is its dual nature as both promise and peril. The same technologies that could prevent the next pandemic might also lower barriers to creating one."
The future of biosecurity will likely depend on finding a balance between several competing priorities:
As individuals and societies, our engagement with biosecurity issues—through informed public discourse, support for responsible research, and advocacy for equitable policies—will help determine whether the biological century becomes an era of unprecedented risk or unprecedented benefit for humanity. The invisible arms race isn't one we can afford to ignore, because in this race, we're all participants—whether we know it or not.